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|a AT/CTY/510/21
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| 100 |
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|a Pinsker, Roy
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| 245 |
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1 |
|a Drawing a line in the Taiwan Strait :
|b 'strategic ambiguity' and its discontents
|c Roy Pinsker.
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| 520 |
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|a The Bush administration's continuing emphasis on US military deterrence of the PRC on behalf of Taiwan threatens to undermine the posture of 'strategic ambiguity' that the United States has proclaimed since 1979. This article argues for the retention of 'strategic ambiguity' and traces the origins of revisionist sentiment towards this effective conflict avoidance mechanism to reactions within the US foreign policy community to the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Case studies of this crisis and its predecessors in 1954-55 and 1958 demonstrate that US military deterrence was not a decisive factor in their resolution. US and PRC initiatives and responses in the 1950s crises introduced the essential elements of 'strategic ambiguity' into the triangular relationship between themselves and Taiwan. In particular, they established a precedent for the United States and the PRC in circumscribing the issue of Taiwan so as to achieve a political accommodation.
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| 650 |
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|a Taiwan Straits crisis
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| 651 |
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|a United States --
|x Military policy
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| 651 |
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0 |
|a Taiwan --
|x Politics and government
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| 773 |
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|a Australian Journal of International Affairs
|g ( Jul.2003; Vol. 57; Issue 2; p.353-368 )
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| 949 |
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